State of Utah v. Jerry J. Dibello : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
State of Utah v. Jerry J. Dibello : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; Sandra L. Sjogren; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
respondent.
Kenneth R. Brown; attorney for appellant.
DAVID L. WILKINSON Attorney General SANDRA L. SJOGREN Assistant Attorney General 236
State Capitol Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
KENNETH R. BROWN 10 West 300 South, Suite 500 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Telephone:
(801) 363-3550 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Dibello, No. 860220.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1110
U i n n t iurnbii i i t ww*r»»* 
GRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCtT 
K F U 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRY J. DIBELLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860220 
Priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER, A FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
JOHN A. ROKICH PRESIDING. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3550 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs . 
JERRY J. DIBELLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 860220 
Priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER, A FIRST 
DEGREE FELONY, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
JOHN A. ROKICH PRESIDING. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3550 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
CONCLUSION 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (1986) 8, 9 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63, 64 (1983) 7, 8, 9 
10, 11 
State v. Johnson, 475 P.2d 543 (1970) 6 
State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (1968) 6 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. ] 
JERRY J. DIBELLO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i Case No. 860220 
i Priority No, 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jerry J. Dibello, was charged with second 
degree murder and convicted by a jury in December 1985 in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. Defendant was 
subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
On or about July 23, 1987, Defendant moved this Court 
to supplement the record as to whether or not an objection was 
made by the Defendant to the introduction of a video tape marked 
and received as State's Exhibit 67 and for clarification as to 
the basis of said objection if one were made. Defendant sought 
by motion with this Court further clarification as to how much of 
the video tape was played to the jury during the State's case in 
chief and whether the jury had access to the entire tape during 
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its deliberation. Defendant also sought in that same motion 
permission to supplementally brief and argue the issues raised by 
the augmentation of record in this Court. 
This Court, based upon parties1 stipulation, remanded 
the case back to the trial court for the purpose of augmenting 
the record as set forth above. This order was signed on August 
10, 1987. 
Hearings have been held in the District Court, the 
Honorable Judge Rokich presiding, evidence has been received, and 
the case is back before this Court for further argument and 
decision. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State, during its investigation of this homicide, 
had prepared a video tape of the crime scene. Tr. Vol. 4, 692-
696.l 
The State also introduced still photos of the crime 
scene, including still photos of the body of the victim and the 
interior and exterior of the trailer which were introduced at 
1 "TIT ." refers to transcript of trial by volume and page 
number; "R." refers to record on appeal; "Aug." refers to tran-
script of proceedings occurring during jury deliberations on 
December 12, 1987, by page number; "Supp." refers to transcript 
of evidentiary hearing occurring on October 20, 1987, by page number. 
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Defendant ' s t r i a l without o b j e c t i o n . 2 The medical examiner 
t e s t i f i e d without challenge as to the cause of death. Tr. Vol. 
I I , 301-310 (multiple stab wounds.) 
Approximately seven minutes and t h i r t y seconds of 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 67, the video tape of the crime scene, was 
played to the jury during the S t a t e ' s case in chief. Supp. 13. 3 
At the time the S t a t e offered P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t 67 , t he 
following exchange occurred between the Court and counsel for 
Defendant: 
THE COURT: Mr. E l ton , before we proceed, we 
probably ought to have the admittance of that tape . 
MR. ELTON: That would probably be appropriate , 
your Honor. We ask that that tape i t s e l f be removed 
from the video tape machine at t h i s time unless you 
want to see i t again. 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, with Mr. El ton 's permis-
s ion, when we recess I would l ike to look at t h i s tape 
again, the res t of that tape again. 
2 P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 4 consisted of a s t i l l photo of the 
t r a i l e r door which was admitted in to ev idence . Tr . p . 51 . 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibi t 6 was a s t i l l photo of the body of the 
victim. Tr. p . 53 P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 9 was a s t i l l photo of the 
body of the victim which was introduced at Tr. 292. P l a i n t i f f ' s 
Exhibit 10 consisted of s t i l l photos of s tab wounds i n f l i c t e d 
upon the vict im. Tr. p . 305. P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 27 was a s t i l l 
photo of the t r a i l e r door. Tr. p . 339. P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit 31 
was a s t i l l photo of a f ingerpr in t . Tr. p . 341. 
3 At t h e s u p p l e m e n t a l h e a r i n g , i t was s t i p u l a t e d as 
ref lected in the record that the portion that was shown to the jury began one minute, 1.6 seconds into the tape and the tape was 
then turned off at eight minutes, 36.4 seconds into the tape . 
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THE COURT: Finef you may do so. But as to the 
portion of the tape that has been exhibited before the 
Court — 
MR. KELLER: I previously stated my objection in 
chambers to that. I believe the Court overruled that 
objection. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ELTON: We ask that the video tape be marked 
as Exhibit No. 67. We have marked that and introduced 
it as evidence at this time. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 67 , the portion of that tape 
that has been shown here before the jury is admitted 
into evidence. (Tr. Vol. 4, 696). (Emphasis added.) 
Trial counsel for Defendant at remand hearing filed an 
affidavit with the Court wherein he indicated that at the trial 
of the action a discussion occurred in chambers between counsel 
for the Defendantf the Court, and the prosecuting attorney 
regarding a certain video tape of the crime scene which was 
subsequently marked and received as State's Exhibit 67. During 
this discussion in chambers, counsel for Defendant objected to 
the receipt of said exhibit on the grounds and for the reasons 
that the prejudicial impact outweighed the probative value of the 
information conveyed in State's Exhibit 67. He further stated 
under oath that at the time he lodged that objection in chambers, 
the Court overruled that objection and the tape was ultimately 
received into evidence. R. . 
At the time of the hearing on remand, trial counsel for 
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the Defendant was asked the following question regarding the 
conversation in chambers: 
Q. Now what was the nature of your objection that 
you stated to the Court? Did that go to both the 
redacted as well as the non-redacted portion of the 
tape? 
A. Yes, it did. My objection went to playing any 
portion of that tape whatsoever on the grounds again 
that any probative value it may have would be out-
weighed by the prejudicial effect on the jury. The 
body of the deceased had been laying in a specific 
position for some period of time. It was clear that 
rigor mortis had set in. There was a certain bloating 
of the body. The tape showed very gruesome wounds to 
the throat area.... 
I believe again whatever probative value that that 
might have provided was outweighed by the prejudicial 
effect. And as I say, the judge overruled the objec-
tion. (Supp. p. 6). 
During the jury's deliberations, at 9:30 p.m. the jury 
made a request to view the video tape again and it was played to 
the jury. Aug. p. 2. 
After viewing the video tape the second time, the jury 
returned its verdict of guilty and defendant appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE VIDEO TAPE OF 
THE CRIME SCENE BECAUSE ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WAS 
OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL IMPACT UPON THE 
JURY. 
R u l e 403 of t h e Utah R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e p r o v i d e s in 
r e l e v a n t p a r t s a s f o l l o w s : 
Al though r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may be exc luded i f i t s 
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probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice ... or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court in 1968 in ruling on the 
predecessor to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence held in 
State v. Poef 441 P.2d 512 (1968) as follows: 
All the material facts which could conceivably 
been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been 
established by uncontradicted lay and medical testi-
mony. The only purpose served was to inflame and 
arouse the jury. 
Factually, in the Poe case, black and white photos had 
been introduced showing the crime scene including the victim's 
body with bullet holes in his head. Colored slides were also 
made during the course of the autopsy which were the subject of 
the Court's ruling. The Court said regarding these pictures, 
"They would have been gruesome in black and whitef but the color 
accentuates their gruesomeness." Interestingly enough, the Court 
reached this conclusion and reversed a capital conviction in the 
absence of an objection from the defendant during the trial, the 
Court noting that "This Court will not allow such a technicality 
to influence its decision in a case such as this." 
Even though the Poe decision supports the defendant's 
position in connection with the receipt of the video tape, it is 
largely devoid of analysis and in many respects is not very 
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helpful to the Court's determination of this particular issue.4 
The first Utah Supreme Court decision which contains 
analysis helpful to a decision in this case is the case of State 
v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63f 64 (1983), wherein the Court in 
analyzing the introduction of gruesome photographs set forth the 
following analysis: 
Our present law makes clear that the trial court 
must be concerned with something more than relevance in 
ruling on the admission of such photographs.... In all 
such cases, the court should determine whether the 
viewing of the photographs by the jury would create a 
substantial danger of undue prejudice against the 
defendant, and if so, whether that danger substantially 
outweighs the photograph's essential evidentiary value. 
The more inflammatory the photograph, the greater the 
need to establish its essential evidentiary value. 
(Citation omitted.) And conversely, the more essential 
the evidentiary value of the photograph, the greater 
the defendant's burden to require its exclusion on the 
basis that its inflammatory nature would be prejudicial 
to him. The point of reference to "essential eviden-
tiary value" in the context of potentially prejudicial 
photographs of the victim's body is that such photo-
graphs would generally be inappropriate where the only 
relevant evidence they convey can be put before the 
jury readily and accurately by other means not accom-
panied by the potential prejudice. 
The case at bar provides a perfect example of abuse of 
discretion in allowing the introduction of the video tape. All 
information that could have been conveyed to the jury which was 
relevant to the State's burden of proof had and was conveyed to 
4
 See also State v. Johnson , 475 P.2d 543 (1970) for 
another case largely devoid oT any analysis and supporting the 
introduction of gruesome photographs. 
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the jury by other non-objectionable means. The cause, manner and 
time of death had been established. No one disputed that the 
victim had died from multiple stab wounds. Everything of 
evidentiary value had been examined by the State Crime Lab 
including possible fingerprints, fiber analysis, blood testing, 
etc. Evidence regarding conclusions drawn from this evidence was 
presented to the jury. A viewing of the video tape by the jury 
was essentially devoid of any "essential evidentiary value." Its 
only purpose could have been to arouse and inflame the jury, 
which is precisely why we have in the Rules of Evidence a 
possible 403 objection. 
The Garcia analysis was developed even further in State 
v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (1986) where this Court reversed a 
second degree homicide conviction based upon a misapprehension of 
the Rule 403 analysis. There the Court held as follows: 
Clearly, it is not enough that a potentially 
prejudicial photograph convey relevant information; it 
must convey relevant information that cannot readily be 
provided to the jury by less potentially prejudicial 
means. See State v. Wells, Utah 603 P.2d 810, 813 
(1979). Moreover, even if the photograph is the best 
available means of conveying the relevant information, 
the essential evidentiary value of that information 
must still be balanced against the potential for unfair 
prejudice. 
The Court then went on to note the following: 
Under Garcia, potentially prejudicial photographs 
are "generally inappropriate" and should not be 
admitted in evidence unless they have some essential 
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evidentiary value that outweighs their unfairly 
prejudicial impact. 663 P.2d at 64. Only after a 
determination has been made that thee photographs have 
such value need the weighing be made. The trial court 
misapprehended the law and for that reason admitted the 
photographs without first properly evaluating the 
evidence. 
As established and set forth in Garcia and expanded 
upon in Cloud, the following analysis should occur when the court 
is faced with the receipt of gruesome photographs or in this case 
video tape evidence. The trial court should begin with the 
proposition that potentially prejudicial photographs are gen-
erally inappropriate unless those photographs contain information 
which has "essential evidentiary value." After it is determined 
that the information contained does have "essential evidentiary 
value," then that "essential evidentiary value" must be weighed 
against the prejudicial impact that the information will have 
upon the trier of fact. Because the trial court in Cloud 
misapprehended the law and used a general relevance standard 
instead of a balancing standard as established in Garcia, the 
court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs. 
In the case at bar, it is difficult to conceive of what 
information conveyed by the video tape is of "essential eviden-
tiary value." Under Cloud and Garcia the weighing or balancing 
that occurs after that determination has been made should never 
have occurred because the video tape is devoid of "essential 
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evidentiary value." All of the information conveyed by the video 
tape had been presented to the jury in non-objectionable form. 
Even if the trial court had performed the analysis as set forth 
in Cloud , it is difficult to see how the "essential evidentiary 
value" of the information conveyed in the video tape outweighed 
the potential prejudice associated with that same information. 
As will be abundantly clear when the Court views the video tape 
at the time of the argument in connection with this case, the 
scene depicted is an extremely gruesome scene. As reflected by 
defendant's lawyer at trial, the body had been laying in the same 
position for a length of time, rigor mortis had begun to set in, 
the body was in a bloated condition and because of this bloating 
there was a gaping of the wound to the neck, the chest and torso 
of the victim were covered with blood, and then the video tape 
goes beyond the actual crime scene into the victim's bedroom 
where a picture of the defendant and the victim as husband and 
wife is conveyed with a caption, all of which is and was extreme-
ly prejudicial. When this information is weighed against the 
possible prejudicial impact of the video tape, there is no 
appropriate way that the evidence should have been admitted. 
As reflected in Garcia, "The more inflammatory the 
photograph, the greater the need to establish its essential 
evidentiary value and conversely, the more essential the eviden-
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tiary value of the photograph, the greater the defendant's burden 
to require its exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory 
nature would be prejudicial to him." Garcia at p. 64. In the 
case at bar, the video tape is extremely inflammatory and that is 
not weighed against a possible claim that the information 
conveyed has strong "essential evidentiary value," but it is 
weighed against very limited, if any, "essential evidentiary 
value." Under the circumstances, the evidence should not have 
been presented to the trier of fact. 
Not only did the jury view this evidence during the 
State's case in chief, but the jury additionally viewed the video 
tape during its deliberation as reflected by the record. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d in a d m i t t i n g over 
defendant 's objection the video tape of the crime scene, defen-
dant respectful ly seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new 
t r i a l . 
Respec t fu l ly submitted th i s day of November, 
1987. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 
1987, four copies of the foregoing Supplemental Brief of Appel-
lant were mailed to Sandra L. Sjogren, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage 
prepaid. 
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